This study proposes a Pareto improving congestion pricing using tradable bottleneck permits (TBP) scheme under the condition that marginal utility of toll cost changes among drivers. The TBP scheme is originally one of the first-best time-varying pricing schemes. However, it is not revealed that the scheme could achieve a Pareto improvement when marginal utility of toll cost changes among drivers. This study aims to analyze the effects of the TBP scheme on departure time choice of drivers and to propose a second best pricing scheme where a Pareto improvement can be achieved. In particular, we focus on a one-to-one network with a single bottleneck and employ a departure time choice model to discuss the case that there exists heterogeneity in schedule flexibility and toll resistance. Two classes for two attributes are assumed as the heterogeneity respectively: "busy/free" and "rich/poor". Under the condition, we formulate the drivers' utility changes caused by implementation of the TBP scheme. The cases with and without the TBP scheme are analytically compared. It is shown that the TBP scheme is not Pareto improving, where the utility of "busy-poor" drivers is decreased. In order to achieve a Pareto improvement, we propose partial implementation of the TBP scheme. In the partial implementation scheme, the bottleneck capacity is assigned to drivers with and without bottleneck permits, where the driver who has a bottleneck permit can pass through the bottleneck without congestion and a driver without it goes through congestion. As a result, we reveal conditions which can satisfy a Pareto improvement. This study finally discuss the requirements for a Pareto improvement that are derived by the proportion of the amount of issued bottleneck permits, the number of each class drivers, and the magnitude of heterogeneity.
Introduction
Morning commute through traffic congestion to a central business district (CBD) is a common feature in cities around the world. The congestion is not caused so much by high demand but by a concentration of demand during a short (peak) period. In order to control the morning traffic congestion, congestion pricing is considered one of the efficient methods. The pricing concept is based on the economic theory of marginal cost and is a mechanism to improve social benefit (Pigou, 1920) . Social cost can be minimized by charging drivers as much as their externalities if the externalities are static. In dynamic scheme, such as traffic congestion, queues at bottlenecks and their interactions should be considered to minimize the social cost. Vickrey (1969) firstly proposed a departure time choice model, which describes the tradeoff between schedule delay and waiting delay. Arnott et al. (1990) showed that the congestion is eliminated and social optimal state can be achieved if drivers are charged equivalent to their waiting cost. Doan et al. (2011) showed that the optimal pricing strategy exists in a single bottleneck model. However, it is difficult to determine the appropriate charging price because drivers' information, such as their value of time and schedule constraint, is required. In order to determine the appropriate charging price without any drivers' information, Akamatsu et al. (2006) proposed tradable bottleneck permits (TBP) scheme. In the TBP scheme, the road administrator issues bottleneck permits and creates markets whereby drivers can freely trade the permits. The permits are required for drivers to pass through the bottleneck at a specified time. The permits are issued as much as the bottleneck capacity. As a result, the price of the permit for each time period is determined by market mechanism, which is equivalent to the toll of the first best pricing. The auction mechanism to determine the price of bottleneck permit has been also studied by using evolutionary approach (Wada and Akamatsu, 2013) . As another pricing methodology to determine congestion charge by using market mechanism, tradable credit (TC) scheme is popular (Yang and Wang, 2011; Nie and Yin, 2013; Xiao et al., 2013) . The biggest difference between the TPB scheme and the TC scheme is that drivers' information is not totally required to achieve the social optimal state in the TBP scheme. In the TC scheme, market mechanism decides only the price of the credit and road administrator has to decide time-varying credit charging rate. In the TBP scheme, on the other hand, bottleneck permits are issued for each pre-specified time period and drivers trade the permit in each market. Therefore, toll for each time range can be decided by market mechanism, and it is the social optimal pricing. Akamatsu (2007) mentioned that the TBP scheme can minimize social cost in general networks but it is not always Pareto improving. A Pareto improvement is a property that a system harms no one and benefits at least one. A Pareto improvement should be achieved as the pricing scheme is acceptable for all drivers. As studies about a Pareto improvement in a field of congestion pricing, Daganzo and Garcia (2000) proposed a methodology that classifies drivers as "free" and "paying" alternately. Yodoshi and Akamatsu (2008) analyzed the Pareto improving condition with TBP in a tandem bottleneck network. Sakai et al. (2014) analyzed that in a merging network. This study focuses on drivers' heterogeneity and proposes TPB implementation which can be Pareto improving.
The purposes of this study are to analyze the effects of TBP on departure time choice of drivers from the aspect of a Pareto improvement. In particular, we show the time dependent utility of drivers when different schedule flexibility and marginal utility of toll cost are distributed among drivers. Firstly, by comparing the cases with and without TBP, we show that a Pareto improving is not achieved by full-TBP implementation. Then, in order to achieve a Pareto, we propose partial implementation of TBP, where drivers without TBP have to wait in a queue in a no-toll lane and drivers with TBP can pass the bottleneck without waiting using toll lane.
In section 2, we set a network and drivers' behavior, and then formulate the equilibrium conditions of departure time choice under the TBP scheme. Section 3 assumes drivers' heterogeneity and shows a Pareto improvement is not always achieved by implementation of the TBP scheme by comparing equilibrium state before and after TBP implementation. Section 4 reveals the condition that a Pareto improvement can be achieved by partial implementation of the TBP scheme. Section 5 provides the conclusion.
Equilibrium under TBP scheme
This section describes the problem that. We assumes a target network and drivers in . In the assumption, equilibrium conditions for the analysis in the following sections. Section 2.1 describes the target network which can represent the partial implementation of TBP. Section 2.2 defines drivers' behavior. Section 2.3 formulates the equilibrium conditions for departure time choice under the condition defined in section 2.1 and 2.2.
Target network
This study employs the simplest network, one-to-one origin-and-destination pair with one bottleneck. As shown in figure 1 , the target network can be virtually represented by two routes in order to represent partial-implement TBP. Route 1 has a bottleneck without TBP, and route 2 has one with TBP. The bottleneck capacity μ is assigned to the two bottlenecks. We assume TBP is issued in a ratio of partial capacity mμ out of the whole capacity μ. The rest of the capacity is for the bottleneck without TBP. The ratio of capacity for route 2 to the whole bottleneck capacity (m) must be satisfied:
Under the situation, we can consider the following three cases: (i) m=0, (ii) m=1, and (iii) 0<m<1.
(i) m=0" case is equivalent to condition without any pricing. The case assumes conventional equilibrium conditions and drivers' utility. The equilibrium utility is needed for analysing a Pareto improvement because the analysis requires before and after implementing TBP.
(ii) "m=1" case corresponds to a normal (full-) TBP implementation. Akamatsu et al. (2006) issued the number of TBP as much as the bottleneck capacity. In the following section, we show the full-TBP implementation is not always Pareto improving by comparing drivers' utility at equilibrium state in "m=0" case and "m=1" case.
(iii) "0<m<1" case represents the situation that TBP is partially implemented. This case is the proposed implementation of TBP to be Pareto improving.
Drivers' behavior
This study employs a departure time choice model in which drivers' utility is based on waiting delay. In general departure time choice model, e.g. Vickrey (1969) , drivers decide their departure (arrival) time to minimize their commuting cost in monetary base which consists of waiting delay cost, schedule delay cost, and toll cost. By using Vickrey's model, Arnott et al. (1994) clarified the welfare effect of congestion pricing under the condition with heterogeneity in value of time, value of schedule early/late, and desired arrival time. The model has parameters related to value of time and schedule flexibility. On the other hand, this study employs parameters for schedule flexibility and marginal utility of money in order to represent directly drivers' heterogeneity in schedule flexibility and marginal utility of money as the parameters. We define drivers' utility based on their waiting delay and drivers are assumed to maximize their utility:
where, U i (t) is utility of a driver in group i who arrives at time t, w(t) is waiting delay to arrive at destination at time t, s(t) is schedule delay if a driver arrives at time t; s(t)=t-t 0 , f si (.) is a function that relates drivers' schedule delay to their disutility at that time, p(t) is toll of TPB at time t, and f pi (.) is the function that relates the toll to drivers' disutility. In order to simplify the following descriptions, the constant term in expression (2) 
Equilibrium condition
We formulate the equilibrium conditions under the assumptions described in section 2.1 and 2.2. In order to simply represent that TPB is partially implemented, we formulate the equilibrium condition for departure time choice considering two routes, route 1 (without TBP) and route 2 (with TBP). The equilibrium conditions are "flow conservation", "bottleneck capacity constraint", "market clearing condition", and "departure time choice condition".
Flow conservation: The summation of flow through both bottlenecks is equal to the total demand of the drivers' group, which means that demand has to be assigned in any time.
where, t s is start time of departure and t f is finish time of departure. Bottleneck capacity constraint: At the bottleneck without TBP, if a queue exists and waiting delay is positive, flow rate is equal to its capacity. Otherwise, flow rate is equal to or less than the capacity. The condition is effective for all time of day. (6) where, q ir is flow rate of drivers in group i going through route r, N i is the number of drivers in group i, ρ i is the equilibrium utility for a driver in group i, and U ir is utility of group i going through route r.
Equilibrium and Pareto improving for heterogeneous drivers
This section shows that a Pareto improvement is not always achieved by full implementation of TBP scheme when schedule flexibility and toll resistance change among drivers. Section 3.1 assumes drivers' heterogeneity in marginal disutility of schedule early/delay and marginal disutility of toll cost. Section 3.2 shows the equilibrium solution and disutility for each driver group when TBP is not implemented at all. The state without TBP provides a standard utility at equilibrium when we discuss whether a policy is Pareto improving or not. Section 3.3 shows the equilibrium solution and disutility when TBP is fully implemented, and also shows that a Pareto improvement is not achieved by the full TBP implementation, by comparing the equilibrium utility between before and after implementing TBP.
Drivers' heterogeneity
This study considers heterogeneity in schedule flexibility and toll resistance. We assume two classes for the two attributes and there exist four driver groups. For simplicity, we also assume the number of drivers in each group is equal to each other. Table 1 shows the property of drivers and the number of drivers in each group.
Firstly, in order to represent the heterogeneity in schedule flexibility, the disutility of schedule early/delay is assumed to differ among driver groups as: where, β is a parameter that converts schedule early to disutility, γ is a parameter that converts schedule delay to disutility, and a represents the magnitude of the heterogeneity in schedule flexibility. These parameters have the following constraints:
,
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f s1 {s(t)} is a schedule disutility function for driver groups with the less schedule flexibility. Let's call the group as "busy" group. f s2 {s(t)} is a schedule disutility function for driver groups with relatively more schedule flexibility, so we call the group as "free" group.
Secondly, in the same way, the heterogeneity in marginal disutility of toll cost is represented by using the following two disutility functions. 
where, δ is a parameter that converts toll cost to disutility, which means marginal disutility of toll cost. b means the magnitude of the heterogeneity in toll resistance. In the following, we say the driver groups with the function eq. (12) as "poor" groups and the driver groups with eq. (13) as "rich" groups. Therefore, disutility functions for driver groups are written as: Figure 2 shows the time-varying waiting delay at equilibrium when TBP is not implemented, that is when m=0 (pattern 0 in table 3). The horizontal axis represents time of day and the vertical axis is waiting delay changing timeby-time. Circled numbers which are written under the horizontal axis means which driver groups arrive in the time range. Regardless of the property of toll resistance, busy drivers (group 1, 2) arrive in the time range around their desired arrival time t 0 . The busy drivers wait in a long queue instead of incurring schedule early/delay. On the other hand, free drivers (group 3, 4) arrive in the time range far from their desired arrival time. Free drivers avoid a long queue and suffer schedule early/delay. t s and t f in figure 2 are: Figure 3 shows the time-varying toll of bottleneck permits at equilibrium when TBP is fully implemented, that is when m=1. The arrival pattern at the equilibrium is classified into three patterns corresponding to the magnitude of drivers' heterogeneity.
Equilibrium solution without TBP
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Equilibrium solution with full implementation of TBP
Pattern 1 (m=1, a<b): Figure 3(a) shows the equilibrium state when the magnitude of heterogeneity in schedule flexibility is the stronger than that in marginal utility of toll cost. Similar to the equilibrium pattern without TBP, busy drivers (group 1, 2) arrive in time range around their desired arrival time, and free drivers (group 3, 4) arrive in the time range far from their desired arrival time. In the each time range, rich drivers can arrive in the time range more close to their desired arrival time because they have the higher willingness to pay for arriving in the better time.
Pattern 2 (m=1, a>b): Figure 3(b) shows the equilibrium state when the magnitude of heterogeneity in toll resistance is the stronger. In this situation, rich drivers (group 2, 4) can arrive in the time range around their desired arrival time, and poor drivers (group 1, 3) arrive with the larger schedule early/delay. Then in the each time range, busy drivers (group 1, 2) arrive in time range close to the desired arrival time.
Pattern 3 (m=1, a=b): Figure 3(c) shows the equilibrium state when the magnitude of heterogeneity in schedule flexibility is as strong as that in marginal utility of toll cost. Under the condition, group 1 and 4 arrive in the same time range because the magnitude of "busy-free" and "rich-poor" is the same. Table 2 shows the equilibrium utility in each pattern and also utility changes between without TBP (m=0) and full TBP (m=1). We can distinguish whether the full-TPB implementation is Pareto improving or not. If there are no drivers whose utility decreases, that is Pareto improving. In every pattern, the utility for group 1 decreases, the utility for group 2 increases, the utility for group 3 is not changed, and the utility for group 4 increases. Therefore, a Pareto improvement is not achieved for group 1(busy-poor). In order to achieve a Pareto improvement, it is required not to decrease the utility for group 1. In the next section, we consider partial implementation of TBP and reveal the condition the Pareto improvement can be achieved.
Partial implementation of TBP scheme and Pareto improving
In the previous section, we showed that the full-TPB implementation is not Pareto improving for group 1. In order not to decrease the utility for group 1, this section considers a situation that TBP is partially implemented. The following shows the equilibrium states with the partial implementation of TPB. The equilibrium states are classified into six patterns corresponding to time range when each group arrives. The classified patterns are shown in table 3, which also includes cases in the previous section. These patterns are determined by the TBP implementation rate m and the magnitude of the heterogeneity in schedule flexibility a, and toll resistance b.
As an example, equilibrium state in pattern 7 is shown in Fig. 4 . The upper figure shows the time-varying waiting delay time, and the lower figure shows the time-varying toll of bottleneck permits. In order to draw the figures, we first determine the order of arrival which satisfies the equilibrium condition, expression (6). The equilibrium utility for each group can be calculated as the summation of disutility of waiting delay, schedule early/late, and toll payment at any time when the group is flowing. Table 4 shows the equilibrium utility when TBP is partially implemented and its change for group 1 in each arrival pattern. In pattern 4 and 5, when TBP implementation rate is equal to or less than half, the utility is not changed by the effect of TBP and a Pareto improvement is achieved. On the other hand, in pattern 6, 7, 8, and 9, the utility for group 1 decreases and it is not Pareto improving. In order to clarify the cause of the utility changes, we show the figure 4, which represent time range when each group arrives. Figure 5(a) represents the equilibrium arrival patterns in the route without TBP (route 1) when the magnitude of heterogeneity in schedule flexibility is the stronger than toll resistance (a<b). Horizontal axis represents the TBP implementation rate m, and the vertical axis is the length of schedule early/delay. Areas in the figure represent which group arrives in the time range. For example, when m is between zero and half, group 1 and 2 arrives in time range whose schedule early is between zero and γN/{2(β+γ)μ}, and whose schedule delay is between zero and βN/{2(β+γ)μ}. The important point is that time range in which group 1 arrives becomes wider when m is larger than half, and their schedule early/delay increases. That's why the Pareto improvement cannot be achieved if m is larger than half. In figure 4(b) , we can confirm that the time range of group 2 and 4 (rich groups) become narrow and better as increasing TBP implementation rate m, which means that the utility for rich drivers is increased by the effect of TBP.
Conclusion
This study focuses on partial implementation of TBP and formulates the equilibrium conditions and the solution. By comparing between the equilibrium solutions of without TBP, partial TBP, and full TBP, this study reveals the effect of changing drivers' departure time choice and their utility when marginal utility of schedule early/late and toll cost are distributed among drivers. We formulate drivers' utility based on waiting delay. Firstly, by comparing drivers' utility between with and without TBP, we confirmed that a Pareto improvement is not always achieved when TBP is fully implemented, where the number of issued bottleneck permits is equal to the target bottleneck capacity. In order to achieve a Pareto improvement, this study considered partial implementation of TBP. As a result, we revealed that a Pareto improvement can be achieved if the rate of the number of issued TBP to the bottleneck capacity is less than half, which is the rate of the number of rich drivers to the total number of drivers. This result suggests that implementing TBP partially is a reasonable policy from the aspect of a Pareto improving even if all of congestion is not completely eliminated.
In future, in order to make the model and the result more robust, we will analyse the equilibrium states with more generality for the number of drivers in each group and parameters of the heterogeneity.
